Rivette v. Paupackan Lake: a board can’t ban short-term rentals the deed covenant allows

This is a county trial-court ruling on a motion, decided before trial. It binds only the parties to that case, and other parts of the case are still going forward. Other courts may still find its reasoning persuasive, and it reads a very common type of Poconos covenant.

What happened

Paupackan Lake Association, Inc.’s board of directors adopted a rule banning short-term rentals and later wrote it into Article X of the association’s Rules and Regulations: “the PLA board determined that that [sic] short-term rentals are not permitted. Short term rentals are defined as rentals less than 30 days, which is [sic] inconsistent with the covenant and are not permitted in the Paupackan Lake Association.” Op. at 4–5.

Lot owner Jason Rivette sued the association and others, and moved for judgment on the pleadings on four counts of his amended complaint. Op. at 1. The deed covenant at issue reads:

“The premises hereby conveyed shall be used for only one private single-family dwelling for residential purposes only. Private garages in harmony with the buildings may be erected.”

The covenants also declare that all lots “are held and shall be held, conveyed, hypothecated or encumbered, leased, rented, used, occupied and improved subject to” the restrictions. Op. at 4.

The association argued the motion was premature. It said the covenants had to be read as a whole along with the intended and actual use of the property, and that adopting a ban could not be a breach without clear definitions of “single family,” “dwelling,” and “residential purpose.” Op. at 2.

What the court decided

1. The covenant is unambiguous, so its words control

Applying the rule that restrictive covenants are “strictly construed against persons seeking to enforce them and in favor of the free and unrestricted use of property,” the court found the covenant unambiguous and declined to “read ambiguities into the language with the admission of any parol evidence.” Op. at 3–4 (quoting Pocono Summit Realty, LLC v. Ahmad Amer, LLC, 52 A.3d 261, 269 (Pa. Super. 2012)).

2. Residential use includes renting, short or long

The covenant limits building to one private single-family dwelling and limits use to residential purposes. It does not define residential purposes any further, and it does not limit use to owner-occupied residential purposes. Op. at 4. Reading that together with the “leased, rented” language, the court held:

“The right to rent or lease one’s lot, subject to restrictions limiting construction on the property to one single-family dwelling and use to residential purposes, is inherent in the Deed Covenants.”

“As the Deed Covenant itself does not restrict renting on the basis of the length of a rental, STRs are not inconsistent with the Deed Covenants governing the property.”

3. A board can’t add use restrictions without owner consent

The court held that the board “cannot unilaterally adopt provisions affecting property rights without the consent of the parties whose interests are thereby impaired.” Op. at 5 (citing Schaad v. Hotel Easton Co., 87 A.2d 227, 230 (Pa. 1952), and Huddleson v. Lake Watawga Property Owners Ass’n, 76 A.3d 68, 71 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013)). Because the rule imposed “specific use restrictions beyond the terms of the Deed Covenants, the consent of each individual property owner was needed.” That consent was not obtained, at least from the plaintiff, so “the Rule and Regulation prohibiting STRs is unenforceable.” Op. at 5.

The order

• Count I (enforcement of the deed covenants): granted. The STR ban is unenforceable.
• Count II (damages for breach of the covenants): denied for now. The court said few facts had been pleaded about the amount of damages, and questions about punitive damages and attorney’s fees remain. Op. at 5–6.
• Count IV (relief under the Uniform Planned Community Act): denied for now. The plaintiff seeks lost rental income, return of fees paid to the association, attorney’s fees, and punitive damages. The court said the conduct of the board and its members and the amount of damages raise factual questions. Op. at 6.
• Count V (a declaration that all lot owners have an unlimited right to rent): denied for now. The court called that broader request premature on the limited facts in the pleadings. Op. at 7.

“Denied” here means the court would not decide those counts on the pleadings alone. It did not rule against the plaintiff on them, and they remain in the case. Op. at 8.

Why it matters

Many Poconos covenants use almost exactly this language: one single-family dwelling, residential purposes only. Rivette reads that language the way the Commonwealth Court read similar covenants in Chan and Ruffed Grouse Ridge. It permits renting, and a board cannot add a minimum rental period by rule. It also stands in contrast to Reilly v. Arrowhead Lake, where a Monroe County court upheld an association’s rental policy based on different covenant language. The words of your own covenant still decide the question.

A ban is not the same thing as a fee, but the reasoning carries over. If a board cannot restrict rentals beyond what the covenant allows without each owner’s consent, a fee imposed only on owners who rent faces the same question.

Pin cites are to the Opinion & Order dated March 18, 2026. Read the full opinion on our Paupackan Lake Estates page. This summary is educational and is not legal advice.